Christoph Schottmüller

[research] [teaching] [links]

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I am associate professor at the University of Copenhagen. From April 2018 onward I will be professor at the University of Cologne.

Department of Economics
University of Copenhagen
Øster Farimagsgade 5, building 26
DK-1353 Copenhagen K

office: 26.1.16
phone: +45 35 32 30 87
email: [first name] [dot] schottmueller [at] econ [dot] ku [dot] dk
fingerprint: 334F EC88 1845 975B 8C43 AF9B AAF0 4B91 85F0 9B43
public key here



Working Papers

Competing with big data (with Jens Prüfer) paper slides numerics

An informational theory of privacy (with Ole Jann) paper supplementary material slides

Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired paper, R&R JET

How Jeremy Bentham would defend against self-fulfilling attacks (with Ole Jann) paper slides slides25

Do health insurers contract the best providers? Provider networks, quality and costs (with Jan Boone) paper slides, R&R IER

Stochastic mechanisms and quasilinear preferences (with Jan Boone) paper (inactive)


Facilitating consumer learning in insurance markets: What are the welfare effects? (with Johan Lagerlöf) paper, Scandinavian Journal of Economics doi, accepted for publication
supplementary material: here, Python code: here

Monopoly insurance and endogenous information (with Johan Lagerlöf) paper slides, International Economic Review doi, Vol. 59, February 2018, pp. 233-255
new supplementary material: here, Python code: here and here

Health insurance without single crossing: why healthy people have high coverage (with Jan Boone), wp Q & A, Economic Journal doi, Vol. 127 (599), February 2017, pp. 85-104
supplementary material: see here

Procurement with specialized firms (with Jan Boone) wp, RAND Journal of Economics doi, Vol. 47, Fall 2016, pp. 661-687
supplementary material: here

Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions, preprint including webappendix, Journal of Economic Theory doi, Vol. 158, July 2015, pp. 127-164
supplementary material: main text example, interior binding ic, bunching example

Correlated equilibria in homogeneous good Bertrand competition (with Ole Jann), preprint, Journal of Mathematical Economis doi, Vol. 57, March 2015, pp. 31-37

Cost incentives for doctors: A double-edged sword, preprint, Q & A, European Economic Review doi, Vol. 61, July 2013, pp. 43-58


University of Copenhagen

2014- : Mechanism design (MSc) course website

2012- : Game theory (MSc) course website

2017: Seminar Economics of Privacy course website

2013: Health insurance (MSc Public Health) outline

My guidelines for thesis supervision (Ba and MSc). Please, read before contacting me.

I created a template for students who want to get started with LaTeX. Read the "Getting Started" part of the wikibook first. Then have a look at the following files: .tex (with explanations of common usage), .bib (bibliography), example graphic, .pdf (the compiled output), plain .tex template. If the use of BibTeX for citations is unclear, check Martin Osborne's guide.

I created some jupyter notebooks that explain how you can make professionally looking plots, numerically solve maximization problems and numerically solve (systems of) equations. I think all of this can be extremely helpful when writing a seminar paper or a thesis. The backend for all this is the julia programming language but no prior knowledge of programming is required. The notebooks can be found here.


Schedule for the micro seminar: link

Institutions I am/was affiliated with or visited in the past:


Software and IT:



I have written some python code to solve school choice matching problems as well as some simple programs to solve finite strategic form games of complete information. Both can be found on github. Neither is computationally fast as both were only made for teaching purposes. Check the .org files as they contain lots of explanations.

For some of my papers, I used julia for numerical analysis.


  • Economics of Privacy slides
  • Hart "A theory of firm scope" QJE 2010 slides
  • Segal/Whinston "Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities" slides