Advanced Microeconomics (Master Economic Research)

News

  • Due to health issues, there is no lecture on April 25. I will inform you as soon as I am better about a make up meeting.
  • We will skip the topic "Nash equilibrium" and will talk about "Bayesian Nash equilibrium" on April 25. Please, watch screencasts 07-09 until then.
  • exam date: July 18, 14:00-15:00 in the usual lecture room

Time and place

  • Thursday, 14:00-17:30, Seminarraum 3.03 (118/03/3.03)

Setup

Please, watch the screencasts provided below before coming to class. You have the option to ask questions about the material in the screencasts (and I might ask you a few questions to see whether things are clear). We will then do the exercises. In terms of preparation, you have to watch the screencasts and read through the exercises on the respective topic and think roughly 10 minutes about each of them. (Don't be discouraged if you do not manage to solve them quickly. Some of them are a bit tricky.) One organizational remark: as we have only one projector, it is useful to bring a printout of the exercises with you to class.

Material

Prerequisites

I assume that you have some introductory knowledge of game theory on the level of (Gibbons (1992)). In particular, you should know the material in chapters 1 and 2 in Gibbons' book (strategic form games, dominance, mixed strategies, mixed and pure Nash equilibrium, extensive form games, game trees, backwards induction, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) and be able to apply it in simple games. From Advanced Microeconomics I, we build upon the part about decision making under uncertainty (expected utility theorem). In terms of mathematics, it is helpful to master the material of the course Advanced Mathematics for Economists. Having said that, most of the used math tools will not be far beyond high school maths. At the minimum you have to know (partial) differentiation, integration and optimization of functions and basic statistics (discrete and continuous probability distributions, expected values as well as Bayes' rule and conditional probabilities). More importantly, you should also have some idea of what a mathematical proof is. There is a handout on maths covering some of the prerequisites and topics that people tend to forget about quickly.

Books

Most material is covered in (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995)) which is abbreviated MWG in the following. Roughly speaking, we will cover chapters 8, 9, 13 and 23 from this book.

Some other interesting books on game theory covering the course material partially are

  • (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)) (FT): Covers an impressive amount of material in considerable depth at PhD level. Some of the proofs are, however, not fully worked out.
  • (Maschler, Solan, and Zamir (2013)) (MSZ): Impresses with very clear proofs and fully worked out examples. Do, however, not expect to find much economics in this book.
  • (Osborne and Rubinstein (1994)) (OR). A very nice book that is freely available for download from the authors' websites.

For mechanism design, (Börgers (2015)) is an excellent source which naturally covers much more than we do in the course.

Schedule

The following plan is…well a plan…and as such it might be adapted to unforseen circumstances if necessary.

Static games of complete information I

  • strategic form games and their interpretation (OR ch. 1 and 2.1)
  • iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies (MWG 8.B)
  • rationalizability (MWG 8.C)
  • refresher reading (optional): MWG ch. 7

Static games of complete information II

  • mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MWG 8.D)
  • Brouwer's fixed point theorem and existence of Nash equilibrium (MSZ 5.3; MWG 8.Appendix gives a proof using Kakutani's fixed point theorem)

Static games of incomplete information I

  • Bayesian Nash equilibrium (MWG 8.E)
  • simple examples of BNE

Static games of incomplete information II: Auctions

  • first price auction (Gibbons 3.2B or MWG Example 23.B.5)
  • second price auction (MWG Example 23.B.6)
  • common value auction
  • further not required reading: if you are interested in experiments: Ngangoue and Weizsäcker "Learning from unrealized versus realized prices", working paper, 2018); a detailed source for what we did is Krishna's book "Auction Theory" (academic Press 2010)(ch. Krishna (2009), 2 and 6).

Dynamic games I

  • backwards induction and subgame perfect equilibrium (MWG 9.A and 9.B)
  • one shot deviation principle (MWG 9.B)
  • Rubinstein bargaining (MWG 9.Appendix A)
  • forward induction (MWG 9.D)

Dynamic games II

  • beliefs and sequential rationality (MWG 9.C)
  • perfect Bayesian equilibrium (MWG 9.C)
  • sequential equilibrium (MWG 9.C)
  • alternative not required reading: OR ch. 12 is a well written piece on the issues mentioned in the lecture; OR ch. 11 covers some more foundational issues that we skipped

Signaling and refinements

  • Spence signaling model (MWG 13.C and MWG 13.Appendix)

Mechanism design I: revelation principle

  • mechanism design problem (MWG 23.B)
  • revelation principle (MWG 23.B)

Mechanism design II: dominant strategy implementation

  • Gibbard Satterthwaite theorem (MWG 23.C)
  • Pivot (and VCG) mechanism (MWG 23.C)

Mechanism design III: Myerson- Satterthwaite

  • Bayesian implementation (MWG 23.D)
  • envelope theorem (MWG 23.D p. 887-889)
  • Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem (MWG 23.E)

Mechanism design IV: screening

  • non-linear pricing by a monopolist (see handout)
  • a classic reference on this topic is (Maskin and Riley (1984)), MWG cover a different screening problem in Example 23.F.1 and MWG pp. 897-903 is recommended reading

Mechanism design V: optimal auctions

  • revenue equivalence (MWG 23.D p.889-)
  • optimal independent, private value auctions (MWG Example 23.F.2)

Mechanism design VI: welfare optimal mechanisms and limits

  • welfare maximizing mechanism in bilateral trade
  • limits when number of agents gets large in bilateral trade and public good setting
  • references: Börgers 3.4.3; FT ch. 7.4.5+7.4.6

Bibliography

Börgers, T. (2015): An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, New York.
Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole. (1991): Game Theory, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Gibbons, R. (1992): A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Krishna, V. (2009): Auction Theory, Academic press.
Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green. (1995): Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, New York.
Maschler, M., E. Solan, and S. Zamir. (2013): Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Maskin, E., and J. Riley. (1984): “Monopoly with incomplete information,” Rand journal of economics, 15, 171–96.
Osborne, M. J., and A. Rubinstein. (1994): A Course in Game Theory, MIT press.

Disclaimer