Imperfect Information in Health Care Markets

News

  • Exam dates are Feb 4, 14:30 (100 Hörsaal VIII) and March 17, 10:00 (100 Aula 2 100/01/Aula 2). Registration is open on KLIPS. We will try to grade the exams of the first date before the registration deadline of the second but we cannot guarantee that we will manage (we managed in previous years).
  • Note that there will be a first exercise session on October 15. This exercise session is dedicated to repeating some mathematical concepts used in this course.

Course materials

Please note that I do not use ILIAS because (i) I did not agree with certain usage conditions concerning tracking and data utilization and (ii) I want to make the material I create publicly available. The material below might get updated over the course of the term.

  • The exercises as pdf. Exercises for the first week are available here.
  • Slides
  • Data sets and instructions for case studies:
    • exercises (as pdf) and datasets for the empirical lectures are here available for download
    • some notes on how to work on the longterm care insurance case study and the deductibles case study (in Julia)
  • An old exam is available.
  • material created by other people:
    • a video on (adverse) selection
  • Notes
    • notes (book project – not all parts are relevant!; password announced in lecture)

Lecture times:

  • lecture: Wednesday, 10:00-11:30 in 100/U1/HS V
  • exercise classes: Wednesday, 14:00-15:30 100/U1/HS VIII

Textbooks

The course is not based on a single textbook. The majority of topics is covered in (Zweifel, Breyer, and Kifmann (2009)) (library link to ebook). (Morrisey (2008)) (link to ebook) covers also many of the discussed topics but has an (almost entirely) empirical approach. Detailed references are given in the schedule below.

Prerequisites and background

I assume that you know some introductory microeconomics, e.g. chapters 1-6 "Intermediate Microeconomis" ("Grundzüge der Mikroökonomik") by Hal Varian. A working knowledge of high-school mathematics and basic statistics (distribution, expectation, correlation, regression) is also needed.

Detailed schedule

This is a plan and as every good plan it may be adjusted if necessary.

Intro (2 lectures)

  • Choice, preferences, utilities, welfare, models
    • mathematical prerequisites: functions, expected value of a discrete random variable, summation sign
    • economic prerequisites: preferences, utility maximization, Pareto efficiency, welfare
    • choice, preferences, utility
    • choice under uncertainty and expected utility
    • welfare
    • models
    • reading:
  • Insurance demand
    • mathematical prerequisites: inverse functions, derivatives, monotonicity as well as concavity and convexity
    • certainty equivalent and risk premium
    • drivers of insurance demand
    • (coverage choice and state dependent utility)
    • reading: (ch. Morrisey (2008), 3)
    • supplementary reading: (ch. Eisenführ and Weber (2013), 9)

Selection (5)

Moral hazard (3)

  • The question of moral hazard and empirical evidence
    • mathematical prerequisites: significance in statistical tests (e.g. t-test)
    • slope of demand
    • RAND and arc elasticity of demand
    • Oregon
    • welfare
    • ex ante moral hazard
    • reading: (sections Einav and Finkelstein (2018), 1,2 and 3.1)
  • Treatment choice and the donut hole
    • mathematical prerequisites: (continuous) distributions (density, distribution function)
    • simple model of treatment choice
    • donut hole
    • out of sample predictions
    • utilization management and gatekeeping
    • reading: (Einav and Finkelstein (2018), 3.2 -end)
  • Case study: moral hazard in NL
    • diff-in-diff estimate for arc elasticity of demand

Physician-patient interaction (4)

Bibliography

Behrend, C., F. Buchner, M. Happich, R. Holle, P. Reitmeir, and J. Wasem. (2007): “Risk-adjusted capitation payments: how well do principal inpatient diagnosis-based models work in the german situation? results from a large data set,” European journal of health economics, 8, 31–39.
Boone, J., and C. Schottmüller. (2017): “Health insurance without single crossing: why healthy people have high coverage,” Economic journal, 127, 84–105.
Doherty, N. A., and P. D. Thistle. (1996): “Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets,” Journal of public economics, 63, 83–102.
Dulleck, U., and R. Kerschbamer. (2006): “On doctors, mechanics, and computer specialists: The economics of credence goods,” Journal of economic literature, 44, 5–42.
Einav, L., and A. Finkelstein. (2011): “Selection in insurance markets: Theory and empirics in pictures,” Journal of economic perspectives, 25, 115–38.
---. (2018): “Moral hazard in health insurance: What we know and how we know it,” Journal of the european economic association, 16, 957–82.
Eisenführ, F., and M. Weber. (2013): Rationales Entscheiden, Springer-Verlag.
Fang, H., M. P. Keane, and D. Silverman. (2008): “Sources of advantageous selection: Evidence from the medigap insurance market,” Journal of political economy, 116, 303–50.
Finkelstein, A., and K. McGarry. (2006): “Multiple dimensions of private information: evidence from the long-term care insurance market,” American economic review, 96, 938–58.
Fuchs, V. R. (1978): “The Supply of Surgeons and the Demand for Operations,”National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA.
Gruber, J., and M. Owings. (1996): “Physician incentives and Cesarean delivery,” Rand journal of economics, 27, 99–123.
Hemenway, D. (1990): “Propitious selection,” Quarterly journal of economics, 105, 1063–69.
Krasnik, A., P. P. Groenewegen, P. A. Pedersen, P. von Scholten, G. Mooney, A. Gottschau, H. A. Flierman, and M. T. Damsgaard. (1990): “Changing remuneration systems: effects on activity in general practice.,” British medical journal, 300, 1698–1701.
Lagerlöf, J. N., and C. Schottmüller. (2018): “Monopoly insurance and endogenous information,” International economic review, 59, 233–55.
McGuire, T. G. (2000): “Physician Agency,” in Handbook of health economics, ed. by Culyer, A. J. and J. P. Newhouse. Elsevier, 461–536.
Morrisey, M. A. (2008): Health Insurance, Health Administration Press Chicago.
Rothschild, M., and J. Stiglitz. (1976): “Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information,” Quarterly journal of economics, 90, 629–49.
Ven, W. P. van de, and R. P. Ellis. (2000): “Risk Adjustment in Competitive Health Plan Markets,” in Handbook of health economics, ed. by Culyer, A. J. and J. P. Newhouse. . Handbook of health economicsElsevier, 755 – 845.
Zweifel, P., F. Breyer, and M. Kifmann. (2009): Health Economics, Springer Science & Business Media.
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